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DIGITAL COLONIALISM: THE 21ST CENTURY 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA THROUGH THE 
EXTRACTION AND CONTROL OF USER DATA AND 
THE LIMITATIONS OF DATA PROTECTION LAWS
Danielle Coleman*
Abstract
As Western technology companies increasingly rely on user data globally, 
extensive data protection laws and regulations emerged to ensure ethical use of that 
data. These same protections, however, do not exist uniformly in the resource-rich, 
infrastructure-poor African countries, where Western tech seeks to establish its 
presence. These conditions provide an ideal landscape for digital colonialism.
Digital colonialism refers to a modern-day “Scramble for Africa” where large-
scale tech companies extract, analyze, and own user data for profit and market 
influence with nominal benefit to the data source. Under the guise of altruism, large 
scale tech companies can use their power and resources to access untapped data on the 
continent. Scant data protection laws and infrastructure ownership by western tech 
companies open the door for exploitation of data as a resource for profit and a 
myriad of uses including predictive analytics. 
One may believe that strengthening data protection laws will be a barrier to 
digital colonialism. However, regardless of their relative strength or weakness, data 
protection laws have limits. An analysis of Kenya's 2018 data protection bill, the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and documented actions of large-
scale tech companies exemplifies how those limits create several loopholes for 
continued digital colonialism including, historical violations of data privacy laws; 
limitations of sanctions; unchecked mass concentration of data, lack of competition 
enforcement, uninformed consent, and limits to defined nation-state privacy laws.
* Danielle Coleman - J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Michigan Law 
School. Danielle is an emerging movement lawyer in the tech space dedicated to the in-
tersection of entrepreneurship, technology and Black lives. Thank you to Professor Laura 
Beny, my advisor, for her dedication in teaching and representation of Black excellence, 
Donna Scaffidi for her unparalleled support during this process, the Michigan Journal of 
Race & Law and its editors, especially Cleo Hernandez for ensuring this piece came to 
fruition and my family and friends who have supported me throughout my academic ex-
periences.
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INTRODUCTION
To discuss the extraction, synthesis, and control of user data is to 
discuss the pulse of commerce, the ever-looming power of large tech 
companies, and the shift of human emotional interaction to everything in 
our daily lives. However, to discuss the extraction, synthesis, and control 
over user data and critical connectivity infrastructure by Western tech 
companies in African countries with limited infrastructure, limited data 
protection laws, and limited competition—combined with social, politi-
cal and economic power imbalances and decades of resource pillaging—is 
to discuss digital colonialism.
This Note argues that digital colonialism is part of the modern day 
“Scramble for Africa” that takes place through the extraction and control 
of user data by large scale tech companies. Part I will establish the back-
ground of colonization and the role of corporations so as to enable the 
comparison between nineteenth century colonialism and twenty-first 
century colonialism. Part II will explain the definition of digital colonial-
ism, why data is a rich resource comparable to natural resources, and how 
large tech companies exploit this resource for profit and for use in predic-
tive analytics. Part III will explain the limits to the purported solution to 
digital colonialism—data protection laws—using examples from the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Kenya’s 2018 Data Protec-
tion Bill.
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I. Colonization and the Role of Corporations
In the nineteenth century, many African countries faced imperialist 
aggression through military invasions, land conquests, economic exploita-
tion, genocide, and violent resource extraction at the behest of European 
world powers. This colonialist rise began after the end of the Transatlan-
tic slave trade and was formalized at the Berlin Colonial Conference, 
where soon to be colonial powers gathered to develop a plan that would 
upset and disrupt the social, economic, and political landscape of Africa 
forever.1 Between 1884 and 1885, under the guise of White supremacy, 
deeply ingrained anti-Black sentiment, and unchecked power, European 
powers carved up the continent in what has become known as the 
“Scramble for Africa”—the creation of arbitrary lines equating to colo-
nies, and the forced subjugation of African peoples.2 At the end of the 
conference, the powers present signed the General Act of the Conference 
of Berlin, giving purported legal effect to their new territories under the 
baseless premise that African nations had no sovereignty and no legal 
claim over their state, land, or resources.3 This, coupled with the beliefs 
inherent within the White imagination that African peoples were “evolu-
tionar[il]y backward and undeveloped” and that “[i]t was a European re-
sponsibility to act as trustees of Africa until Africans were mature enough 
to govern themselves,”4 set the ideological tone for ruthless colonization.
European powers’ proliferation of claims in Africa were characteris-
tically expeditious such that, by 1900, European states including Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain had 
claimed nearly 90 percent of African territory.5 Due to the rise of indus-
trial capitalism, there was a staunch belief that the economic, and thus 
political, future of an industrial country hinged on exclusive control of its 
markets and raw materials.6 Therefore, colonial powers stole from the 
1. Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for 
Africa, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1802, 1807 (2016).
2. See id. at 1802.
3. Matthew Craven, Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and 
the Logic of Free Trade, 3 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 31, 32 (2015).
4. Jennifer Tanabe, Scramble for Africa, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 11, 2015),
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Scramble_for_Africa&oldid=
988092.
5. BERLIN CONFERENCE OF 1884–1885, OXFORD REFERENCE (2010), 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-
9780195337709-e-0467.
6. A. ADU BOAHEN, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON COLONIALISM 32 (1987).
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lands of Africa, violently extracting raw materials such as copper, cotton, 
rubber, tea, gold, diamonds, and tin.7
At the center of this pillaging was a simple colonialist economic 
agenda, to provide maximum economic benefit at a minimal price.8 Ac-
cordingly, investing in industrialization, improving the production pro-
cesses, or strengthening the overall economy of the colonies was not a 
priority.9 Oftentimes, the colonial powers refused to process the raw ma-
terials in-country, sending the raw materials to Europe to be processed, 
obliterating the role of Africans in the export business and robbing them 
of any economic profit and potential resource flow that could have de-
rived from processing raw materials in country.10 Although some colonial 
powers did invest in transportation infrastructure such as railways, such 
investments were strictly for the benefit of facilitating the efficient 
transport of raw materials and not for the enrichment of the countries 
themselves.11 Simply put, “the infrastructure that was developed was de-
signed to exploit the natural resources of the colonies.”12
Corporations, aiding in this colonialist economic agenda, also 
played a dominant role in colonial expansion. As early as the seventeenth 
century, dozens of companies were granted trading monopolies by their 
respective governments throughout the world.13 Their monopoly over 
trade in specified territories allowed these corporations the power to safe-
guard this monopoly and the power to exert rights over their country-
men who lived and worked within the territory.14 The granting of mo-
nopoly status by colonialist governments made these highly risky ventures 
safer for investors with profit as the primary motive.15 Investing in trading 
companies emerged as one of the earliest forms of venture capital as, 
“money could be raised in return for shares, profits could be divided 
among shareholders, and shares could be transferred among members and 
outsiders.”16
7. See Felix K. Ekechi, The Consolidation of European Rule, 1885-194, in COLONIAL 
AFRICA, 1885–1939, at 27, 36 (Toyin Falola ed., 2002); Julius O. Adekunle, West Africa,
in COLONIAL AFRICA, 1885–1939, at 377, 384 (Toyin Falola ed., 2002)
8. Joshua Dwayne Settles, The Impact of Colonialism on African Economic Devel-
opment 8 (May 1, 1996) (unpublished thesis, University of Tennessee Honors Program) 
(on file with University of Tennessee, Knoxville).
9. Id. at 7.
10. BOAHEN, supra note 7, at 61-62.
11. Settles, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Id.
13. Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 IND.
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After a brief hiatus, the nineteenth century saw the resurgence of 
trading companies as weapons wielded for colonial expansion and as ad-
ditional revenue streams for the emerging economic system of industrial 
capitalism.17 By then, the experience of companies from the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries such as the British East India Company had 
helped establish the corporate form as a dominant force for settlement 
and colonization.18 This second wave of colonization by trading compa-
nies proved to be robust, as “more than 75 percent of British acquisitions 
south of the Sahara were acquired by chartered companies”—not by eq-
uitable trading practices, but by monopolized consent, violence, and a 
virtual absence of competition in extracting raw materials and resources.19
The four major trading companies of the nineteenth century con-
sisted of the British South African Company, the Germany East African 
Company, the Imperial British East African Company, and the Royal 
Niger Company.20 Over the span of decades, trading companies expand-
ed indirect colonial rule through possessing new “protectorates or spheres 
of influence”,21 exploited local faction rivalries, arming them in exchange 
for better trading deals,22 and established para military forces to facilitate 
trading goals and increase profit,23 laying the foundation for the eventual 
mass exploitation of mineral resources and agricultural opportunities 
across Africa including Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Central Africa, and 
East Africa.24 The control of territories by companies established for the 
“explicit purpose of making money, meant, inevitably, that the territories 
were administered simply for profit,” and that the companies took no in-
17. Id. at 368.
18. Id. at 370.
19. McLean, supra note 14, at 370.
20. EUGENE STALEY, Modern Chartered Companies, in WAR AND THE PRIVATE 
INVESTOR (1937), https://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/investor/Staley11.html.
21. William Reno, Order and commerce in turbulent areas: 19th century lessons, 21st century 
practice, 25 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 607, 613 (2006), https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/01436590410001678889
22. Id. at 611.
23. STALEY, supra note 20. (“In connection with the colonial expansion of Europe in 
the late nineteenth century, there appeared a brief revival of the type of organization 
known as the chartered company. The hallmark of these—- called privileged companies 
or sovereign companies—-was their possession of authority to govern as well as to carry 
on commerce in territory placed under their jurisdiction. They were empowered to es-
tablish forts and police systems, to lay out roads, encourage colonization, levy duties and 
taxes.”); See also British South Africa Company, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/British-South-Africa-Company.
24. BOAHEN, supra note 7, at 61-62.
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terest in developing local industrialization outside of its benefits for ad-
ministering the movement of natural resources and raw materials.25
Although these companies were principally chartered to facilitate 
“trade,” they were also legal extensions of the crown, a fact that afforded 
them the right to assert sovereign powers over the non-European peoples 
within the colony—a power they frequently exerted.26 Trading compa-
nies gradually became more intrusive in the governance of the colonies 
to further their economic interests and those of the colonial powers.27 As 
the intrusion grew, more demands were made on non-European states, 
through threat of military action, to concede to the interests of the trad-
ing companies.28 Eventually, chartered companies, as extensions of the 
crown, were an authoritative force in territories, playing an imperative 
role in territorial annexations and profiting from raw materials and valua-
ble minerals—their primary reason for existing.29
Steeped in desperation to serve the industrial capitalist structure 
built upon the backs of African people and lands—the foundation for 
neo-mercantilism—colonial powers violently took over nations and ex-
ploited resource-rich African lands for their own economic benefit and 
global economic prowess, both directly and via chartered companies.
II. Digital Colonialism
A.  Defining Digital Colonialism
Earlier colonialists arrived on African shores to expand their empires 
by exploiting local labor to extract valuable natural resources and raw 
materials, building critical infrastructure like railroads in the process to 
facilitate the import and export of these often dispossessed goods.30 To-
day’s colonialists, however, are digital. They build communication infra-
structures such as social media platforms and network connectivity for the 
express purpose of harvesting data, churning a profit, and/or storing the 
data as raw material for predictive analytics.31
“Digital colonialism” is the decentralized extraction and control of 
data from citizens with or without their explicit consent “through com-
25. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2007).
26. Id. at 68-69.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 68, 72.
29. STALEY, supra note 20.
30. See generally Michael Kwet, Digital Colonialism: US Empire and the New Imperialism 
in the Global South 60 RACE & CLASS 3 (2019).
31. Id.
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munication networks developed and owned by Western tech compa-
nies.”32 As professors Hendricks, Marker, and Vestergaard from the Uni-
versity of Copenhagen posit, this structure has four fundamental actors:
(1) The Western tech companies who create and provide 
the technology and infrastructure that harvest the data 
for ad targeting and ad distribution;33
(2) The advertising and consulting firms who use the tech-
nology provided by (1) to target various groups with 
highly personalized ads and messages aimed at increasing 
profits;34
(3) The “local companies, parties, and organizations who 
pay (2) to help them impose their different agendas for 
the respective countries”;35 and
(4) The citizens who knowingly and unknowingly act as da-
ta sources for (1) and as target groups for (2) and (3).36
Scholar Michael Kwet further explains:
Under digital colonialism, foreign powers, led by the United 
States, are planting infrastructure in the Global South engi-
neered for its own needs, enabling economic and culture 
domination while imposing privatized forms of governance. 
To accomplish this task, major corporations design digital 
technology to ensure their own dominance over critical func-
tions in the tech ecosystem. This allows them to accumulate 
profits from revenues derived from rent (in the form of intel-
lectual property or access to infrastructure) and surveillance (in 
the form of Big Data). It also empowers them to exercise con-
trol over the flow of information (such as the distribution of 
news and streaming services), social activities (like social net-
working and cultural exchange) and a plethora of other politi-
32. Silas L. Marker, Mads Verstergaard & Vincent F. Hendricks, Digital Colonialism on 
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cal, social and economic and military functions mediated by 
their technologies.37
Laying critical connectivity infrastructure owned by Western tech 
companies, to extract and control untapped user data, however, is the 
vanguard for this cultural and economic dominance. The extraction, 
analysis, and control of data in African countries with limited infrastruc-
ture, limited data protection laws, and limited competition, combined 
with social, political, and economic power imbalances and decades of re-
source pillaging is what gives the above consequences true power.
B. Data as a Resource
According to the Oxford New English Dictionary, currency is de-
fined as a system of assets, property, and resources owned by someone or 
something in general use in a particular country.38 Data is the new cur-
rency, and access to data—rather than money, natural resources, or ad-
vanced weaponry—is now the most valuable asset available to nation-
states and corporations.39 This development lays the foundation for large 
Western tech companies’ movement into African markets.
Data is collected by corporations of all sizes through online behav-
ioral tracking technology which “refers to the practice of tracking web 
users (and mobile apps users) on the Internet . . . .”40 This technology 
records a large variety of data including, but not limited to, ad clicks, de-
vice specific information, face scan, ISP, ad name, phone numbers, search 
queries, time, date, browser history, email addresses, IP addresses, loca-
tion, operating system, and profile information.41 The method of tracking 
this data includes, but is not limited to, cookies, doubleclick and Adsense, 
profile information, device tracking technology, facial recognition soft-
ware, and search queries.42 Collectively, this data creates an “anonymous”
digital profile of millions of users that is ultimately used to integrate mul-
tiple accounts to produce personalized content for location services and 
37. Kwet, supra note 28, at 7-8.
38. Currency, ENGLISH OXFORD DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/currency (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
39. Data is the New Currency of Geopolitics, CIPHER BRIEF (Sept. 16, 2018), 
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/data-is-the-new-currency-of-
geopolitics.
40. Ankur Arora & Monika Arora, Digital-Information Tracking Framework Using Block-
chain, 7 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. SYS. 1, 1 (2018).
41. Mark van Rijmenam, What Data Do The Five Largest Tech Companies Collect - Info-
graphic, DATAFLOQ (July 15, 2018), https://datafloq.com/read/what-data-do-the-five-
largest-tech-companies-colle/427.
42. Id.
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notification, and, most importantly, to be sold to data brokers, used as a 
means for selling access to users for targeted advertising by third party 
corporations, or collected and stored for future predictive analytic use.43
With over 1.25 billion people living in Africa,44 this market represents a 
treasure trove of data, much of which is as yet untapped by Western tech 
companies.45
Due to this robust and efficient online behavioral tracking technol-
ogy, consumerism has now shifted from a story of mass consumption to a 
“story of one.”46 Because of the rapid development of portable techno-
logical devices like iPhones, smart watches and tablets, coupled with the 
constant and ever-increasing use of social media across generations,47 the 
potential for consumer engagement can now operate twenty-four hours a 
day, making the transition from mass advertising to targeted advertising a 
lucrative pursuit. Now, advertisers no longer must make assumptions 
about consumers’ behavior48 and can instead target consumers with ex-
treme precision based on hyper-personalized data.49
This helps corporations attract new business and “maximize en-
gagement among target audiences,” resulting in a higher return on in-
vestment,50 and creating a more efficient and cost-effective process for 
43. Suneel Grover, Big Digital Data, Analytic Visualization, and the Opportunity of Digital 
Intelligence, SAS INSTITUTE INC. (2014), https://support.sas.com/resources/papers/
proceedings14/SAS171-2014.pdf; Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here are the data 
brokers quietly buying and selling your personal information, FAST COMPANY (2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-
and-selling-your-personal-information.
44. Benjamin Elisha Sawe, How Many People Live In Africa?, WORLD ATLAS (2018), 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/how-many-people-live-in-africa.html.
45. Acha Leke & Landry Signé, Africa’s Untapped Business Potential: Countries, sectors, 
and strategies, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BLS18234_
BRO_book_006.1_CH5.pdf (last visited July 5, 2019).
46. Michelle Evans, Why Data Is The Most Important Currency Used In Commerce Today,
FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michelleevans1/2018/03/12/
why-data-is-the-most-important-currency-used-in-commerce-today/#be5259854eb3.
47. Percentage of U.S. population with a Social Media Profile from 2008 to 2019, STATISTA
(2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-a-
social-network-profile/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
48. Rebecca Walker Reczek, Christopher Summers & Robert Smith, Targeted Ads 
Don’t Just Make You More Likely to Buy - They Can Change How You Think About Yourself,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/targeted-ads-dont-just-make-
you-more-likely-to-buy-they-can-change-how-you-think-about-yourself.
49. Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex Than It Lets On, WIRED
(May 25, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-targeted-ads-are-more-
complex-than-it-lets-on/.
50. Chris Dobson, Targeted Advertising Requires Good Data, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/04/05/targeted-advertising-
requires-good-data/#4a1537fd29db.
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promotion, price point decision making, and distribution of products 
and/or services.51 Within the modern capitalist society, this is the most 
valuable information any company can possess.
However, the value of this data is based on the ability to “make 
sense of the avalanche of data,”52 and companies like Alphabet and Face-
book have a leading edge due to their size, access to data, resources, and 
data science infrastructure.53 For less robust companies and marketers, 
harnessing data effectively can be challenging,54 as “the abundance of data 
produced by disparate sources has made the task of identifying and unify-
ing relevant insight seem colossal.”55 The inherent technical challenges in 
turning large stores of data into valuable currency means that behemoths 
like Alphabet and Facebook are well-positioned to dominate new large 
markets with their highly-equipped platforms and resources by synthesiz-
ing the data into usable information, effectively controlling the market.
Artificial intelligence, specifically machine learning and natural lan-
guage processing, gives companies the capability to better synthesize bil-
lions of data points and make inferences about users.56 This data can be 
used to infer personal information such as a person’s background, religion 
and beliefs, political views, sexual orientation and gender identity, social 
connections, health, ethnicity, income levels, educational attainment, 
marital status, family composition, financial stability, and creditworthi-
ness, all without the user directly giving this information.57 “The result is 
the creation and amalgamation of digital footprints that provide in-depth 
knowledge about [one’s] life.”58 This data is eventually synthesized, used, 
and sold for immense profit.59
What is more alarming is that a handful of tech companies, like Al-
phabet and Facebook, are able to use artificial intelligence for predictive 
analytics, which is “the use of data, statistical algorithms and machine 
learning techniques to identify the likelihood of future outcomes based 
51. Susan Ward, Use Target Marketing & Market Segmentation to Improve Your Bottom 
Line, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/target-
marketing-2948355.
52. Evans, supra note 43.
53. Id.
54. Dobson, supra note 47.
55. Id.
56. Vivian Ng & Catherine Kent, Smartphone Data Tracking Is More Than Creepy –
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on historical data.”60 The goal is to go beyond knowing what is happen-
ing and what has happened to provide a best assessment of how users will 
behave in the future.61 Although predictive analytics can have positive ef-
fects in many sectors, such as the healthcare industry, they can also distort 
the lines of privacy when dealing with individualized human behavior, 
particularly when only a handful of companies have this information.
These possible intrusions into basic concepts of privacy can be seen 
in Facebook’s uncanny ability to predict when a person is motivated to 
do something,62 when a person is feeling a range of emotions, such as 
feeling down,63 and when a couple’s relationship will end64—all before 
the users even know it themselves. Predictive analytics allows a handful 
of companies to understand even the innermost emotions, and to predict 
how this will affect future behavior. This information is extremely useful 
to millions of corporations across the globe. It can affect the global econ-
omy, workforce development, small and large scale investments, resource 
allocation, advertising, presidential elections, and every single segment of 
global capitalism.
Furthermore, since machines are not humans and cannot “think,”
artificial intelligence needs gargantuan sets of data to “learn” from and 
derive its predictive accuracy—to which only a handful of corporations 
have access. Facebook itself has access to over two billion people’s sensi-
tive information, including what they “like” and “dislike,” who their 
friends are, to whom they talk the most, and where they physically trav-
el65—a level of intimate personal data that no other company in the 
world has. Google dominates search engines with the ability to collect 
data on over 1.17 billion global users.66 Companies like Facebook and 
Google then use these highly personal inferences and sensitive data as a 
means of selling access to individuals to third-party corporations67—
60. Predictive Analytics: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/
en_us/insights/analytics/predictive-analytics.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
61. Id.
62. Matsakis, supra note 46.
63. Id.
64. Alexis Kleinman, Facebook Can Predict With Scary Accuracy If Your Relationship 
Will Last, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/14/
facebook-relationship-study_n_4784291.html.
65. Kwet, supra note 28, at 11.
66. Felix Richter, 1.17 Billion People Use Google Search, STATISTA (Feb. 12, 2013), 
https://www.statista.com/chart/899/unique-users-of-search-engines-in-december-
2012/.
67. Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Uses Your Data for Ad Targeting, RECODE (Apr. 
11, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/4/11/17177842/facebook-advertising-ads-
explained-mark-zuckerberg.
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making 40 billion dollars in 2017 alone.68 Additionally, when only a se-
lect few companies have access to the largest sets of valuable data, they 
have a supreme advantage over competitors, ultimately controlling that 
market and deciding who gets access, both presently and in the future, 
while making the most profit.69
For tech companies, the treasure trove of citizens’ data that lies in 
Africa is a natural resource. The data may be extracted and sold as a 
commodity to corporations and political interests who base their revenue 
model on knowing their target groups so that they are able to push polit-
ical messages and agendas or sell targeted products to citizens, thereby in-
creasing their bottom-line.70 The essence of this business model is already 
established in the West. Tech companies “provide seemingly free com-
munication services and search engines” and track users across platforms, 
apps and the internet, all to enable advertisers to target consumers and 
voters with hyper-personalized ads based on behavioral patterns, making 
an enormous profit. However, when this business strategy is pursued in 
countries with limited infrastructure, limited data protection laws, and 
limited competition—while rooted in neoliberal notions of human 
rights—it transitions from a business model into a form of digital coloni-
alism.
Facebook’s Free Basics and Project Aires, and Google’s Project 
Csquared and Project Loon, are just a few projects deployed by Western 
tech companies in Africa as they expand their global reach for profit.71
Much like the colonialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who 
built critical infrastructure like railroads for the sole purpose of continu-
ing to economically exploit the natural resources of Africa, giant tech 
companies like Facebook and Alphabet are building network connectivi-
ty infrastructure for the benefit of profiting from the use of their online 
68. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 
Results (Jan. 31, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/
2018/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2017-Results/default.aspx.
69. Kwet, supra note 28, at 11.
70. Marker et al., supra note 30, at 6.
71. Paul Sawers, Google and Partners Commit $100 Million to African Broadband Project 
CSquared, VENTUREBEAT (May 16, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/05/16/
google-and-partners-commit-100-million-to-african-broadband-project-csquared/; Tom 
Simonite, Project Loon, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar./Apr. 2015), https://www.technology
review.com/s/534986/project-loon/; Njeri Wangari Wanjohi & Kofi Yeboah, Free 
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services, rather than building local infrastructure for sustained economic 
development in African countries.
In 2017, Google and its partners committed $100 million to 
Csquared, a broadband project in Africa aimed at providing high-speed, 
affordable, and reliable connectivity infrastructure to further grow inter-
net access in Africa.72 This is a laudable goal; however, by “doubling 
down on its efforts to support the underlying internet infrastructure, 
which, in turn, opens up new markets for the internet giant’s own online 
services,” it increases their access to data.73 In 2012, the idea for Project 
Loon was born in order to get billions of people online where cell towers 
do not exist via helium balloons.74 This type of technological advance-
ment could be revolutionary for rural communities and other places in 
which millions of people are in desperate need for internet access yet 
physical hardware connectivity is not always possible, particularly after 
natural disasters. However, as scholar Tom Simonite in the MIT Tech-
nology Review notes:
It is odd for a large public company to build out infrastructure 
aimed at helping the world’s poorest people. But in addition 
to Google’s professed desires to help the world, the economics 
of ad-supported Web businesses give the company other rea-
sons to think big. It’s hard to find new customers in Internet 
markets such as the United States. Getting billions more peo-
ple online would provide a valuable new supply of eyeballs 
and personal data for ad targeting.75
Although software is not technically infrastructure, it is also central 
to the overall development of technological connectivity being used to 
harvest data for economic profit. Free Basics, Facebook’s mobile applica-
tion, gives users in developing nations access to limited online services 
and content for free. “Fundamentally, Free Basics is a data-lite mobile ap-
plication that allows users to browse a narrowed down version of the in-
ternet”76 as an “on ramp” to introduce internet to those who otherwise 
would not have access.77 By using neoliberal code words like “democra-
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cy,” “equality,” and “internet as a basic human right,” Facebook masks 
its true long-term goal of collecting data on “the next billion.”78 Free Ba-
sics harvests an enormous amount of metadata on users.79 When a user 
clicks on a website in Free Basics, “that click sends packets of data to Fa-
cebook’s servers.”80 Furthermore, “[s]ince all of the data exchanged on 
Free Basics goes through Facebook’s Proxy servers, Facebook now has a 
way to access users [sic] data outside of Facebook.”81 Research by Citizen 
Media and activist group Global Voices found that the Free Basics pro-
gram has enabled Facebook to gather data about the habits, interests, and 
behaviors of users in the developing world, where Facebook aspires to 
have a strong presence as more users come online.82 In sum, “Free Basics 
is a closed space where Facebook picks the content—and profits from us-
ers’ data along the way—creating what some people call a ‘poor internet 
for poor people.’ ”83
Only 31 percent of people on the continent of Africa have access to 
the internet,84 making it clear that Africa faces connectivity, access, and 
infrastructure issues. However, it is by no means certain that this is a 
problem for foreign tech companies.85 Due to this lack of infrastructure 
and connectivity, giant tech companies are acting as the “White savior,”
much like colonial powers who disguised the Scramble for Africa as liber-
alization intended to help the “noble savage.” These companies claim 
that they want to bridge the digital divide and give internet access to the 
millions of people who otherwise would not have it, but their true pur-
pose is simply to extract data for profit and predictive analytics.
Furthermore, by capitalizing on “ ’first mover’ advantage” with an 
army of lawyers and operating on such a massive scale, giant tech compa-
nies face extremely limited competition, both locally and internationally, 
and can outcompete or simply buy up competitors around the world.86
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Much like chartered companies in the nineteenth century, who used lim-
ited trade competition to create monopolistic economic control within 
the colonies, these giant tech companies can control how the connectivi-
ty infrastructure is built, what apps and services users have access to, and 
what happens to the data due to the lack of competition. With Free Ba-
sics spanning sixty countries, reaching hundreds of millions of mobile 
phone users in Africa alone,87 Facebook has the most data points about 
new users from emerging markets, and the best resources to synthesize 
this data into usable information—more than the majority of other com-
panies in the market and most governments.88 This makes Facebook the 
centerpiece of control for extremely valuable data sets, at no benefit to 
the users or the countries themselves.
III. Limitations of Data Protection Laws
Some scholars believe that the digital colonialism as described in
Part II, is enhanced by scant data protection laws in Africa that leave users 
exposed.89 However, the limits to data protection laws, which occur re-
gardless of the relative strength or weakness of the laws, are overwhelm-
ing and fail to provide a panacea to digital colonialism. This Part de-
scribes these limitations and how they operate.
A.  The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
Kenya’s Data Protection Laws
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came in-
to force on May 25, 2018, is now the world’s strongest data protection 
law.90 It applies to European companies broadly, as well as any company 
across the globe that collects data on its citizens. Designed to modernize 
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laws that protect sensitive and personal information of users,91 this law 
“reshape[s] how technology companies store, process, and profit from us-
ers’ personal information.”92 It also gives the user the “right to be forgot-
ten,” as well as the right to withdraw their data from collection.93
GDPR has elevated the standard for data protection laws globally, 
and yet in Africa, there is no continent-wide consensus of an approach to 
personal data protection, as some countries have little to no data protec-
tion laws or constitutional protections, while others have robust data pro-
tection laws.94 Based on 2017 data, there are seventeen countries in Africa 
that have enacted comprehensive personal data protection legislation. 
Three more countries, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, have enacted per-
sonal data protection legislation that is currently moving through the 
lawmaking process. In addition, the African Union (AU) adopted the AU 
Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection (AU Convention) in 
June 2014,95 which provides “a personal data protection framework 
which African countries may potentially transpose into their national leg-
islation.”96 However, the AU Convention has only been ratified by four 
of the fifty-four AU member jurisdictions and needs to be ratified by fif-
teen member jurisdictions in order to take effect.97 Nevertheless, there 
are common themes and principles between the GDPR and comprehen-
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data retention and destruction;
registration with a data protection authority (DPA);
cross-border data transfers;
personal data breach notification; and
appointment of a data protection officer (DPO).99
Many of these themes are incorporated in Kenya’s 2018 Data Pro-
tection Bill (DPB), which is said to mirror the GDPR.100 Once passed, it 
will give Kenyan citizens a series of rights including: 1) the right to ask 
companies to clearly explain, using accessible language, how their person-
al data is being collected, used, and stored; 2) the right to request that 
their personal data be deleted; and 3) the right to object to their personal 
data being used for specific purposes like targeted advertising.101 This will 
also require companies to gain consent from users before collecting their 
data.102 The DPB is all-encompassing, applying to “all data subjects, re-
gardless if they reside in Kenya, whose data is, or has been, collected or 
processed by a data controller in Kenya.”103 However, this bill has re-
ceived much scrutiny,104 and many provisions, much like some in the 
GDPR, reflect the limits of data protection laws against digital colonial-
ism.
Once enacted, the Bill will give effect to Article 31(c) and Article 
31(d) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which guarantees every person 
the right not to have “information relating to their family or private af-
fairs unnecessarily required or revealed,” and the right not to have “the 
privacy of their communications infringed.”105 This will directly tie this 
law to the Constitution of Kenya, the supreme law of the land, which is 
binding on all persons.
B. Violation of Data Privacy Laws
Unfortunately, big tech companies can violate (and have blatantly 
violated) these laws, since they have the time, money, and resources to 
fight for their desired outcomes, even if they stand in direct violation of 
pre-established laws. For example, Uber has flaunted its willingness to 
99. Id.
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operate in clear violation of local laws, launching in cities where its oper-
ation violates city ordinances.106 “The company’s non-compliance with 
city ordinances ranges from Uber drivers not having the required driving 
permits to refusing a request by California state regulators to provide in-
formation about their drivers.”107 Uber’s violation of the law extends 
globally—a French Court in 2016 convicted Uber of violating French 
transport and privacy laws.108
Additionally, Google Books made a clear and public move to vio-
late copyright law.109 The goal of Google Books was to scan millions of 
books into digital format to add to their search engine, despite the pro-
ject’s clear violation of age-old copyright laws.110 At this legal battle’s in-
ception, approximately 24 million titles were under copyright protection. 
The potential cost for Google infringing on each work totaled 3.6 tril-
lion, and yet Google forged ahead.111 After a nearly decade-long legal bat-
tle, Google prevailed, and the courts upheld their fair-use claims.112
These examples from the Global North indicate that the presence of 
a comprehensive data protection legislation does not mean that large tech 
companies will actually comply if the benefit of violation exceeds the 
burden of consequence. This also proves the limits to penalties, fines, and 
sanctions against large tech companies—digital colonialism’s most promi-
nent purveyors.
C. Limitations of Penalties, Fines, and Sanctions
GDPR fines for offenses are the greater sum of up to 20 million eu-
ros or 4 percent of a firm’s global turnover.113 However, if Google was 
willing to risk paying 3.6 trillion for a clear violation of law, arguably it 
would be willing to risk paying the GDPR penalty. That is, if the viola-
tion is worth it for the company, or if they have the resources to defend 
the alleged violation in court, the company may go ahead with its ac-
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tions, even if it knows they are likely to be in violation. Kenya’s DBP on 
the on the other hand, is silent on penalties or fines against corporations 
found to be in violation of the data protection law, leaving it up to the 
complaints commission to decide the course of action.114Although this is a 
better proposition considering that the complaint commission may be 
able to exercise more effective sanctions that would serve as greater de-
terrents for large tech companies than monetary fines, there is still a 
loophole. Large tech companies and data brokers could simply dissolve 
before they ever have to face any accountability measures. This is the 
current predicament of Cambridge Analytica.
Cambridge Analytica, a data firm, harvested the personal data of ap-
proximately 50 million Americans and at least one million Brits through 
Facebook.115 This data was ultimately used to influence the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election of Donald Trump, as demonstrated by Cambridge 
Analytica’s CEO, who was caught via secret recording claiming direct 
credit for the election of Donald Trump.116 Additionally, senior execu-
tives were “filmed describing its dominant role in Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta’s election campaigns in 2013 and 2017 and were caught 
boasting about psychological manipulation, entrapment techniques and 
fake news campaigns.”117 The Information Commissioner’s Office, a UK 
independent authority, is prosecuting SCL Elections, Cambridge Analyti-
ca’s parent company, for failing to comply with an enforcement notice.118
However, SCL Elections filed bankruptcy in May and will be completely 
dissolved by the January 2019 trial date.119 The ICO is examining wheth-
er the SCL Elections directors can still be pursued; however, it seems that 
this major data firm will escape unscathed despite their clear violation of 
pre-GDPR protection laws.120 All of this sets the foundation for the po-
tential abuse of power by large tech companies who can blatantly violate 
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laws and skirt fines, penalties and sanctions, leaving the local citizens 
whom they exploit for data extraction powerless, despite clear data pro-
tection laws.
D. Mass Concentration of Data and Lack of Competition Enforcement
Another clear limit to data privacy laws is that the lack of protection 
against the mass concentration of data by dominant players is compound-
ed by the lack of competition enforcement measures. Competition, data 
protection, and consumer protection law are inextricably related, and da-
ta privacy legislation often does not take this into account—Kenya’s  
DPB included. Without these protections, enormous amounts of data 
will be centrally held and owned by dominant players who have the re-
sources to stomp out their competition, leaving the fate of millions and 
sometimes billions of people’s personal and sensitive data in the hands of 
a select few.
This was particularly visible in the merger decision for Facebook 
and WhatsApp. Facebook already had a lion’s share of the data market, 
with access to over 2 billion users’ data. The “main reason for Facebook’s 
interest in WhatsApp is believed to lie in the troves of data that came 
with the acquisition”121—namely, 500 million users. This was also a stra-
tegic acquisition to help Facebook fuel growth in developing markets, 
opening up data extraction opportunities for over 172 million WhatsApp 
users in Africa.122 The lack of protection against mass concentration of da-
ta and the lack of regulation of anti-competitive conduct by companies 
fuels the concentration of mass data, as there are no regulations within 
data privacy law that apply when a company has either 1) simply amassed 
too much data at the risk of users or 2) has amassed too much data at the 
risk of users through means of acquisitions, decreasing market competi-
tion.
Additionally, this hole creates a high barrier of entry for small, me-
dium, and local tech companies who simply cannot compete with global 
tech companies. The cost for running centralized social networks is ex-
tremely expensive. A company must pay for costly cloud infrastructure, 
find and pay skilled programmers, and be able to pay for quality data col-
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lection and storage in a way that adheres to data privacy law standards.123
A company must also think of a way to monetize their service in order to 
cover these costs.124 Moreover, “competitors include multi-billion dollar 
corporations, who already dominate the market, enjoy the benefit of 
network effects, have accumulated brand equity and trade secrets, and 
have the power to acquire smaller companies.”125 This leads to an over-
whelming dynamic where “the largest sets of valuable data—such as so-
cial data” (Facebook, WhatsApp), and search (Google)—are concentrated 
and thereby controlled by a handful of “winners,” with no regulations 
within data privacy to promote and maintain market competition.126
E. Consent
Lastly, this inextricably affects the notion of consent, as “it is often 
argued that strong competition enforcement could render data protection 
rules more effective by facilitating genuine consumer choice.”127 Regard-
less of the requirements laid out by Kenya’s data protection privacy bill, 
when one combines a lack of genuine consumer choice (due to the ex-
treme lack of market competition) with a strong desire and or need for 
the service, can true consent be granted for data extraction?
Many believe that user consent to the authorization of data extrac-
tion and user consent to sell data to third parties shifts the power dynamic 
to equality between large tech companies and data subjects; however, this 
is simply untrue. When the users’ desire for the service exceeds the threat 
of data misuse, consent will be freely given. The World Wide Web 
Foundation conducted a study in three countries, Kenya, Indonesia, and 
Philippines, on “Teenagers Use of Social Media and their Understanding 
of Privacy Issues in Developing Countries.”128 Teenagers are the highest 
users of social media and thus at the highest risk for data misuse.129 The 
results of this study concluded that “[m]ost surveyed teenagers are aware 
that social media companies collect their personal data, but are not 
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knowledgeable or do not care about how these platforms use these [da-
ta].”130 So, the largest users of social media in three major countries, in-
cluding Kenya, are aware of data collection but do not register or care 
about data misuse. Thus, their consent for data extraction is given care-
lessly leaving the tech companies still in control of blind users.
Additionally, the requirement of consent has not shifted the power 
to users, as users are often uneducated on data sharing and misuse. Even 
when they are aware, users oftentimes cannot understand the policies and 
thus blindly consent.
A Deloitte survey of 2,000 consumers in the U.S found that 91 
[percent] of people consent to legal terms and services conditions without 
reading them. For younger people, ages 18-34 the rate is even higher 
with 97 [percent] agreeing to conditions before reading. The language is 
too complex and long-winded for most.131
In Africa, “(p)rivacy advocacy groups say users of the Free Basics 
Service, who may be getting online for the first time, may have little or 
no understanding of what information is even being collected from 
them.”132 Furthermore, the World Wide Web Foundation study found 
that “[w]hile the teenagers were typically relaxed about sharing their per-
sonal information, they seemed to be unaware that, by using social me-
dia, they also share data they do not input directly, such as location data 
and browsing history.”133 When users do not understand what they are 
consenting to, the concept of consent is null and void. The companies 
have no one to keep them accountable, and they remain in control by 
taking advantage of the ignorance of their large user base.
Even valid consent does not prevent data misuse. Large tech com-
panies will still own personal and sensitive data after consent is given, and 
they can still sell this data to third parties without any accountability 
measures. Much like when Cambridge Analytica acquired millions of da-
ta and used it to manipulate presidential elections, “the company pointed
out, this wasn’t a leak or data breach of any kind—it’s simply how Face-
book works.”134 “ ’Everyone involved gave their consent,’ according to 
the company’s response on the matter.”135
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F. Limits to Defined Nation-State Privacy Laws
The limits presented above are based on the current state of tech-
nology. However, as technology continues to develop rapidly, and large 
tech companies invest in a variety of beta testing experiments, the limits 
of the current data protection laws will only become more prominent. 
Privacy laws are typically designed to “only be enforceable within de-
fined nation-state borders.”136 However, some speculate that large tech 
companies are seeking to exist outside of national borders entirely.137 For 
example, in 2013, mystery Google barges were seen on the Western and 
Eastern coasts of the United States. They appeared to be floating data 
centers,138 perhaps an early attempt at sea-steading.139 Sea-steading “is the 
attempt to create non-governmental entities outside of recognized bor-
ders and gain freedom from legal control.”140 If large tech companies 
could create sea-steads, they could operate in international waters, com-
pletely unregulated, while owning the data of billions of users, dodging 
data privacy laws all together.141
CONCLUSION
Digital colonialism is just as oppressive as the early colonialism from 
the nineteenth century. Large tech companies, typically owned and pri-
marily operated by White men, are extracting data from uninformed us-
ers and controlling that data to profit via predictive analytics. Unfortu-
nately, strong data protection laws will not prevent this domination. 
While modern data protection laws may constitute a step in the right di-
rection, further reflection is required to answer the question of how soci-
ety can protect user data in an increasingly digitally-dependent society.
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